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ABSTRACT
We examine the effects of corporate governance and product market competition on the
payout policy when firms are subject to agency problems and external financing
constraints. We find that corporate governance and competition affect corporate payout
decisions. In particular, payout can be an outcome of or a substitute for both governance
and competition among firms depending on the firms’ agency costs of free cash flows
and external financing costs. When examining both effects together, we find that product
market competition subsumes corporate governance in relation to payout policy. Our
results suggest that product market competition as a governance tool can be more
effective than other monitoring mechanisms.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

An important issue in relation to corporate governance and firm behavior is the impact
of governance on corporate payout policy. La Porta et al. (2000) find that firms in
countries where investor rights and legal protections are strong tend to pay higher
dividends. Known as the outcome model, it essentially contends that effective
governance induces firms to disgorge more cash to shareholders, thereby reducing
agency costs of free cash flows. However, Hu and Kumar (2004) demonstrate that firms
with entrenched managers are more likely to pay higher dividends. Gugler (2003) finds
that state-controlled firms that are likely to exhibit higher agency costs have higher
payout. Therefore, contrary to the outcome model, dividends are viewed as a substitute
for external disciplinary mechanism to mitigate managerial incentive problems in the
absence of effective governance.
Another strand of the literature focuses on product market competition as an
external governance mechanism that can reduce manager and shareholder conflicts.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that competition among firms reduces private benefits
of managerial control. In a similar vein, Allen and Gale (2000) suggest that competitive
forces can be an effective governance tool to identify and remove incompetent managers.
Giroud and Mueller (2010) find that product market competition mitigates managerial
slack and is therefore a substitute for corporate governance. Consistent with the above
argument, Grullon and Michaely (2007) find that firms in more (less) competitive
industries have higher (lower) payout. Nevertheless, Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012)
using non-US data report that firms with strong shareholder rights pay higher dividends
in both competitive and concentrated industries.
In this paper, we bridge these two strands of the literature by examining the joint
effects of corporate governance and product market competition on payout policy. If
governance or competition alone is important for a firm’s payout decision, a natural
question that follows is the extent to which the interactions between competition among
firms and their strength of governance influence corporate payout policy. Our
investigation should lead to further understanding into the relative effectiveness of
competition and corporate governance. In particular, we examine whether competition
complements or substitutes corporate governance on corporate payout policy.
Furthermore, we take agency costs and external financing costs into consideration
when examining the joint effects of governance and competition. Chae et al. (2009) find
that these two types of costs are important as they affect the relationship between
governance and payout policy. For example, firms may reduce payout in the presence of
agency problems despite strong governance when facing external financing constraints.
The scope of our paper is therefore broader and more in-depth than those of recent studies
as we examine not only the effects of both governance and competition but also
incorporating firms’ agency problems and external financing constraints together. To our
knowledge, this is the first study that accounts for all of these linkages.
Our empirical analysis yields the following results. First, we find that the
relationship between corporate governance and payout changes depending on agency
problems and external financing constraints. Under high agency costs of free cash flows,
firms with strong governance tend to increase payout. However, when firms with strong
governance encounter high external financing costs, they reduce cash dividends and stock
repurchase even in the presence of high agency problems. Our findings therefore can be
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explained by both outcome and substitution models.
Second, competition plays an important role in a firm’s payout policy. Firms in
less competitive (or more concentrated) industries exhibit lower payout, supporting the
view that competition acts as an external governance mechanism. As these firms
experience high agency costs of free cash flows, they tend to increase payout, suggesting
that dividends are a substitute for governance. However, firms with agency problems in
more concentrated industries reduce their total payout when facing external financing
constraints, a relation that is consistent with the outcome model.
Most importantly, combining the effects of corporate governance and product
market competition reveals that the latter plays a more influential role in a firm’s payout
decision. The importance of corporate governance appears to be absorbed by competition
among firms. Therefore, similar to the results related to the effect of competition alone,
firms in less competitive industries have lower payout. As these firms have high agency
costs of free cash flows, they increase cash dividends and stock repurchases perhaps to
mitigate conflicts between managers and shareholders. External financing constraints
lower the payout of firms in less competitive industries despite the presence of agency
problems.
Our results remain robust after using other proxies for corporate governance,
competition, agency problems, financing constraints, and firm characteristics. In sum, the
findings are consistent with Giroud and Mueller (2010) and Allen and Gale (2000), who
suggest that competition is a substitute for corporate governance, and that it can be more
effective than the market for corporate control and other monitoring mechanisms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the
development of our hypotheses. Section III describes sample selection and data.
Empirical results are reported in Section IV and Section V concludes the paper.
II.
A.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVEOPMENT

Agency Theory and Payout Decision

In light of the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) on agency theory,
Easterbrook (1984) argues that a firm’s payout behavior can be explained by the
principal-agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Firms pay dividends in
return for raising external equity in the capital market where the cost of monitoring is
lower, thereby mitigating agency costs for firms. This agency-cost based explanation is
further extended by La Porta et al. (2000) who suggest that agency problems can be
reduced by effective law enforcement on shareholder rights. It follows that payout can be
related to external governance in which firms operate.
La Porta et al. (2000) formulate two agency-based models of payout policy: the
outcome model and the substitute model. The former states that firms that operate in
strong external governance pay higher dividends to reduce expropriation of free cash
flows by managers. On the other hand, the latter hypothesizes that firms in weak
governance pay higher dividends as a substitute for the lack of governance mechanisms.
Higher payout may help firms to establish good reputation that in turn lowers the cost of
raising external capital.
Accordingly, the outcome model and the substitution model predict opposite
relations between the governance mechanism and dividend payouts. Reconciling these
two competing hypotheses, Chae et al. (2009) find that the relationship between
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governance and a firm’s payout decision can be changed conditional on agency problems
and external financing constraints. For example, a firm with strong governance but high
(low) external financing costs has lower (higher) payout in the presence of agency
problems. They suggest that it is important to consider agency costs and external
financing costs when examining the effect of governance on payout policy.
B.

Product Market Competition and Payout Decision

Tracing back at least as early as Leibenstein (1966), product market competition is often
argued to provide an alternative source of discipline for managers. Shleifer (1985) and
Aghion et al. (1999) point out that inefficient managers in competitive industries are more
likely to be discovered and ‘weeded out’ from firms when the relative firm performance
benchmark is more apparent. Chevalier (1995) and Phillips (1995) highlight that
increased competition tends to reduce ‘slacking’ or ‘shirking’. As a result, competition
increases management effort and firm efficiency that in turn improves firm performance.
In a similar vein, Schmidt (1997) and Raith (2003) suggest that the threat of firm survival
and the disutility from losing jobs strengthen managerial incentives in competitive
industries. Coupled with improved information for comparability among managers,
agency costs can be reduced as managerial behaviors are more aligned with shareholder
interests. Allen and Gale (2000) further argue that product market competition can be
more effective than market scrutiny (via external financing) and internal control measures
as a tool for governance. Along with the reasoning that competition serves as a source of
disciplinary force, Grullon and Michaely (2007) conclude that competitive forces induce
managers to pay excess cash.
C.

External Financing Constraints and Payout Decision

Recent studies pay particular attention to payout policy when firms are under external
financing constraints. Chae et al. (2009) find that firms with financing constraints tend to
pay lower dividends despite having strong governance and high agency costs of free cash
flows. Bates et al. (2009) document that U.S. firms increased their cash-to-assets ratio
from 1980 to 2006 because their cash flows had become riskier. Morellec and Nikolov
(2009) suggest that this is especially the case for firms in competitive industries for
holding more cash as a precautionary move to cover operating losses and avoid inefficient
closure. Therefore, firms experiencing financing constraints tend to hold more cash to
avoid high costs of funding and hedge for future uncertainty (see Han et al. (2007),
Haushalter et al. (2007), and Denis and Sibilkov (2010)). Conversely, if firms exhibit
agency problems without financing constraints, competitive forces that serve as an
effective governance mechanism may induce firms to disgorge more cash to shareholders.
It turns out that while higher dividends mitigate agency problems that arise from the
conflict of interests between shareholders and managers, lower dividends help firms to
hoard cash for precautionary needs in a competitive market. As a result, firms in
competitive industries may have to weigh the benefits of agency cost reduction against
the costs of financing constraints to reach an optimal payout strategy. Controlling for
external financing constraints and agency costs of free cash flows may therefore provide
a more complete picture on firms’ payout behavior in relation to product market
competition. Based on the discussions in the sub-sections above, Table 1 summarizes the
effects of corporate governance and product market competition on payout decisions.
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Table 1
Interrelationships among corporate governance, product market competition and
corporate payout decisions

Corporate governance
Product Market
Competition
D.

Agency
Problems
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

External Financing
Constraints
Yes
No
Yes
No

Payout
+
+

Corporate Governance Versus Product Market Competition

Given the important roles of corporate governance and competition in reducing agency
problems, current debate has shifted to the question of whether competition substitutes
or reinforces corporate governance in payout decision. Giroud and Mueller (2010 and
2011) demonstrate that corporate governance only matters in non-competitive industries.
They show that weaker corporate governance leads to higher input costs, wages, and
overhead costs. At the same time, weak governance firms experience lower firm value
and stock returns, and a decline in operating performance, but only in non-competitive
industries. Their findings suggest a substitute relationship between competition and
corporate governance.
In contrast, Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012) suggest that product market
competition and corporate governance are complementary. They report that stronger
shareholder rights protections are related to better firm performance only in competitive
industries. They argue that competition strengthens the effect of shareholder rights
because relative performance can be more readily compared and evaluated in competitive
industries. It facilitates the detection of underperforming managers that may result in
their dismissals. Therefore, shareholder rights are more effective in competitive
industries. Despite the complementary relationship between shareholder rights
protections and competition, Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012) document that it does not
necessarily apply to payout decision as firms with strong shareholder rights have higher
payout in both competitive and less competitive industries.
Recent studies that examine the interactions between corporate governance and
competition, however, do not take into consideration of agency problems and external
financing constraints of the firms. As discussed earlier, the relationship between
governance and payout decision can change at different levels of agency costs and
external financing costs. Failure to account for these two types of costs may potentially
lead to incorrect inferences when examining the relationship among competition,
corporate governance, and payout decision. Figure 1 summarizes the interrelationship
among each of the key variables discussed above in relation to payout decisions. The
hypotheses can be stated as follows:
H1: The relationship between corporate governance and payout policy is weaker for firms
under agency problems and external financing constraints in competitive industries.
H2: The relationship between corporate governance and payout policy is stronger for
firms under agency problems and external financing constraints in competitive industries.
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Figure 1
The joint effects of corporate governance and product market competition on corporate
payout decisions

III.

DATA AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS

Our sample is obtained from Compustat, RiskMetrics, and U.S. Census of Bureau from
1990 to 2009. The financial information about sample firms is collected from Compustat.
The anti-takeover provisions created by Gompers et al. (2003) for firm-level governance
for the years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 are from RiskMetrics.
We remove firms in financial and utility industries in our final sample since the operations
of firms in these industries are subject to different regulations and their financial
statements may pose different analytical problems than those of regular firms. After
excluding data with missing observations, our final sample consists of 2,714 firms and
18,821 firm-year observations over the period of 1990-2009. Table 2 presents the
distribution of sample firms by year.
As Grullon and Michaely (2004) report that share repurchases have become more
prevalent in the U.S. and U.S. firms are increasingly substituting dividends for share
repurchases, we use both dividends and total payouts (dividends and share repurchases)
scaled by firm’s total assets or sales to measure dividend payout ratios. The total assets
and sales used in scaling payouts are 1-year lagged terms since dividends and share
repurchases declared during a particular financial year are related to the information from
financial reports in the previous year.
We use two measures for corporate governance for robustness checks. Known as
the G-index, Gompers et al. (2003) use the sum of scores from 24 anti-takeover
provisions to create an index to measure a firm’s shareholder protection. A firm with
higher G-index is said to have weak governance. The other governance measure, the Eindex, is developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009) who find that six anti-takeover provisions
are sufficient to measure shareholder protection, i.e., staggered boards, limits to
shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority
requirements for mergers, and charter amendments to summarize the level of shareholder
right. The E-index is therefore more parsimonious than the G-index. We take the
reciprocals of the abovementioned two governance measures (CG1=1/E-index and
CG2=1/G-index) to estimate corporate governance. A higher CG score indicates a
stronger governance measure for the firm.
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Table 2
Sample distribution by year
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total

N
146
1,012
988
992
1,057
1,094
1,154
1,162
1,243
1,179
1,062
965
876
869
851
847
870
863
858
733
18,821

Percent
0.78%
5.38%
5.25%
5.27%
5.62%
5.81%
6.13%
6.17%
6.60%
6.26%
5.64%
5.13%
4.65%
4.62%
4.52%
4.50%
4.62%
4.59%
4.56%
3.89%
100.00%

Regarding product market competition measures, we calculate the Herfindahl
index and the four-firm concentration ratios for each industry according to Ali et al.
(2009). The information collected from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) from the U.S. Census of
Bureau in 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007 (SIC for the years 1992-1997 and NAICS for the
years 2002-2007) is used to calculate two competition estimates.
We also use two measures for agency problems based on Fenn and Liang (2001)
and Chae et al. (2009). The former is defined as net operating cash flow (operating
income after depreciation minus capital expenditure) scaled by total assets while the latter
is earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by total assets.
Denis and Sibilkov (2010) suggest that firms can be classified as constrained if they do
not have long-term debt rating and their debt is outstanding in that year. Thus, we define
a firm with external financing constraints as one with long-term debt not rated by
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) or its debt is in default. Alternatively, Morellec and Nikolov
(2009) categorize a firm as financially constrained if its credit rating is either missing or
rated as non-investment grade. We use this proxy as another measurement for external
financing constraints. Although there are other proxies for financing constraints such as
dividends payout and firm size, we do not incorporate these measures because they are
either inappropriate or highly correlated with the dependent variable in our study.
Our control variables include most common firm characteristics such as leverage,
firm size, and profitability. We use two measures for each of these variables according to
Brown and Caylor (2009), Grullon and Michaely (2007), and Chae et al. (2009). Table 3
defines each of these variables for subsequent empirical analyses.
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Table 3
Variable definitions
Variables
Payouts
DIVt / ASSETSt-1
DIVt / SALESt-1
TPAYt / ASSETSt-1
TPAYt / SALESt-1
Corporate governance
CG1
CG2
Agency costs
FCF1
FCF2
DFCF1
DFCF2

Definition
Cash dividends at period t/total assets at period t-1
Cash dividends at period t/total sales at period t-1
(Cash dividends at period t + stock repurchases at period t )/total assets at
period t-1
(Cash dividends at period t + stock repurchases at period t )/total sales at
period t-1
1/E-index, where E index is developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009)
1/G-index, where G index is developed by Gompers et al. (2003)
(Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization)/total assets
(Operating income before depreciation - capital expenditures)/total assets
Dummy variable equals one if FCF1 exceeds sample median of FCF1 and
zero otherwise, where FCF1 is (Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation,
and amortization)/book value of assets
Dummy variable equals one if FCF2 exceeds sample median of FCF2 and
zero otherwise, where FCF2 is (Operating income before depreciation capital expenditures)/total assets

External financial
constraints
DEFC1
DEFC2
Competition
CONC1
CONC2
Control variables
LEV1
LEV2
SIZE1
SIZE2
PROFIT1
PROFIT2

Dummy variable equals one if a firm's credit score rated by S&P is missing
or belongs to non-investment grade, and zero otherwise
Dummy variable equals one if companies do not have long term debt rated
by S&P long term senior debt rating, and zero otherwise
Herfindahl Index based on Ali et al. (2009)
Four-firm concentration ratio based on Ali et al. (2009)
Long term debt / book value of equity
Long term debt / book value of total assets
Natural log of total assets
Natural log of sales
Income before extraordinary item / (book value of equity + deferred tax)
Net income / book value of equity

IV.
A.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Summary Statistics

Table 4 presents the summary statistics of sample firms. Among the four payout ratios
we measure, there appears to be little difference in the average payout scaled by either
total assets or sales. For the dividend payout, the average DIV/ASSETS and DIV/SALES
are 0.0187 and 0.0182, respectively. Adding share repurchases to dividends, the average
total payout of TPAY/ASSET and TPAY/SALES are 0.0419 and 0.0418, respectively. As
expected, the average total payout is substantially higher than the average dividend
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payout as Grullon and Mihcaely (2004) point out that share repurchases have become a
common tool for distributing earnings back to shareholders. The variability in total
payout is, however, higher than that in dividend payout, confirming that share
repurchases are more discretionary and therefore less sticky than cash dividends.
For governance measures, the average CG1 based on the E-index and CG2 based
on the G-index are 0.50 and 0.11, respectively. The difference in the average CG
measures is due to the different number of anti-takeover provisions used in constructing
the respective index. As discussed earlier, CG1 (Bebchuk et al., 2009) consists of 6 antitakeover provisions compared to 24 anti-takeover provisions for CG2 (Gompers et al.,
2003).
Using two measures of free cash flows (FCF1 and FCF2) as proxies for agency
costs, the average FCF1 and FCF2 are 0.1485 and 0.0936, respectively. These two
measures are similar to those obtained by Chae et al. (2009). There also appears to be
large variations in both FCF measures as measured by their standard deviations,
suggesting that firms may experience relatively high variability in agency conflicts
between managers and shareholders.
Interestingly, the average sample firm tends to experience financing constraints as
defined by both measures DEFC1 and DEFC2. Furthermore, the median of one in both
DEFC1 and DEFC2 indicates that more than half of the sample firms are classified as
having external financing constraints. It is therefore important to factor these constraints
when examining a firm’s payout decisions.
Given that the two measurements for product market competition (CONC1 and
CONC2) differ substantially, it is not surprising that their averages look quite different.
A closer look at the standard deviations of both estimates that appear to be large relatively
to their respective means suggests that the intensity of competition is likely to vary
substantially across industries. A large distribution in competition levels should provide
a robust analysis for the impact of competition on payout decisions.
Among firm characteristics used for control variables, the average leverage (LEV1
and LEV2) of 0.4345 (debt/equity) and 0.1486 (debt/assets) appear to be low. The
average sample firm size of 6.3998 and 6.4710 measured by natural log of total assets
and sales (SIZE1 and SIZE2), respectively, are moderate. With median that is close to its
respective mean, it suggests that firm size measures are not skewed by large firms and
are more symmetrically distributed. Our sample firms appear to be profitable with the
average profitability of 0.1038 (PROFIT1) and 0.1115 (PROFIT 2). Since there are a few
firms in our sample that generate large negative net incomes, we winsorize them at the
1% and 99% levels to reduce the effect of the outliers.
1.

Free cash flows and external financing constraint

We report the preliminary results of payout decisions by firms under different free cash
flows and external financing constraints. Table 5 shows that firms with high free cash
flows (DFCF1=1) have higher average dividend and total payouts than those with low
free cash flows (DFCF1=0). This result is robust regardless how we measure payout.
Since free cash flows are often viewed as a proxy for agency costs, it can be interpreted
as firms with high agency costs tend to pay larger dividends and repurchase more shares
to lower the conflict of interests between managers and minority shareholders.
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Table 4
Summary statistics of the sample firms
Variable
Payouts
DIVt / ASSETSt-1
DIVt / SALESt-1
TPAYt / ASSETSt-1
TPAYt / SALESt-1
Corporate governance
CG1
CG2
Agency costs
FCF1
FCF2
External financing constraints
DEFC1
DEFC2
Competition
CONC1
CONC2
Firm characteristics
LEV1
LEV2
SIZE1
SIZE2
PROFIT1
PROFIT2

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

0.0187
0.0182
0.0419
0.0418

0.0124
0.0109
0.0238
0.0219

0.0279
0.0290
0.0535
0.0614

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

0.9443
0.7901
0.9443
0.8751

18,821
18,821
18,821
18,821

0.5031
0.1171

0.3333
0.1000

0.2744
0.0461

0.1667
0.0556

1.0000
0.5000

4,686
5,401

0.1485
0.0936

0.1435
0.0919

0.0849 -0.5088
0.0854 -0.5212

0.9053
0.8349

18,800
18,575

0.5006
0.8813

1.0000
1.0000

0.5000
0.3234

1.0000
1.0000

18,821
18,821

698.0357 541.0000 540.0173 13.1000 2999.0000
39.3010 37.9000 16.9991 3.6000
97.8000

9798
10,168

0.4345
0.1486
6.3998
6.4710
0.1038
0.1115

0.2613
0.1307
6.2567
6.3762
0.1087
0.1165

0.0000
0.0000

0.7085 0.0000
0.1333 0.0000
2.1429 0.4272
2.0527 -2.5770
0.1589 -6.2957
0.1668 -6.2957

32.7024
0.7108
13.0814
13.0354
1.7380
1.7380

N

18,794
18,794
18,821
18,821
17,939
18,807

However, the relationship between free cash flows and governance mechanisms is
mixed. Using CG1 (E-Index) as a proxy for governance measures, firms with higher
(lower) free cash flows are associated with stronger (weaker) governance (0.5095 vs.
0.4938). The results are different when CG2 (G-index) is considered. That is, the average
CG2 for firms with higher free cash flows is 0.1156 compared to 0.1192 for firms with
lower free cash flows. However, unlike the stark difference in payout between firms of
high and low free cash flows, the differences in governance measures between these two
types of firms do not appear to be economically significant. Richardson (2006) suggests
that the difference in the results between the two governance measures can be related to
some governance provisions that mitigate agency problems more than others do.
On the relationship with competition, we use two estimates for industry
concentration according to Ali et al. (2009). A lower industry concentration measure
indicates more intense competition than a higher counterpart does. As shown in Table 5,
both concentration scores, CONC1 and CONC2, are negatively related to free cash flows,
suggesting that more (less) competition is related to higher (lower) free cash flows. This
relationship is consistent with Morellec et al. (2009), Han et al. (2007), Haushalter et al.
(2007), and Denis and Sibilkov (2010), who find that firms facing more competition tend
to hold more cash for precautionary needs and hedge for future uncertainty.
As expected, firms with higher free cash flows are also characterized with lower
leverage (LEV1 and LEV2), bigger firm size (SIZE2), and higher profitability (PROFIT1
and PROFIT2) than firms with lower free cash flows.
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Table 5
Mean comparison by agency costs of free cash flows and external financing constraints
Variable
Total DFCF1=1 DFCF1=0
t-test
Dividend payouts
DIVt/ASSETSt-1
0.0187
0.0242
0.0133 -27.242
DIVt/SALESt-1
0.0182
0.0226
0.0138 -21.144
TPAYt/ASSETSt-1 0.0419
0.0575
0.0266 -41.447
TPAYt/SALESt-1
0.0418
0.0545
0.0293 -28.837
Corporate governance
CG1
0.5031
0.5095
0.4938
-1.922
CG2
0.1171
0.1156
0.1192
2.771
Agency costs
+++
FCF1
0.1485
0.2022
0.0961 -110.000
FCF2
0.0936
0.1545
0.0327 -140.000
Competition
CONC1
698.0357 675.7606 719.7984 4.039
CONC2
39.3010 39.0246 39.5660
1.606
Firm characteristics
LEV1
0.4345
0.3686
0.4988
12.650
LEV2
0.1486
0.1323
0.1645
16.669
SIZE1
6.3998
6.3985
6.4011
0.080
SIZE2
6.4710
6.5500
6.3939
-5.219
PROFIT1
0.1038
0.1714
0.0388 -61.459
PROFIT2
0.1115
0.1817
0.0430 -62.665

DEFC1=1 DEFC1=0 t-test
***
***
***
***
**
***
***
***
***

***
***
***
***
***

0.0176
0.0168
0.0403
0.0399

0.0267
0.0279
0.0533
0.0554

14.457
17.088
10.760
11.236

***

0.5109
0.1199

0.4738
0.1060

-3.764
-9.036

***

0.1469
0.0921

0.1605
0.1043

7.131
6.285

***

693.5830 733.1368 2.292
38.8431 42.8119 7.541
0.4082
0.1430
6.0695
6.1550
0.0981
0.1043

0.6299
0.1902
8.8526
8.8171
0.1477
0.1645

13.957
15.788
63.502
63.392
13.450
16.099

***
***
***

***

***
**
***

***
***
***
***
***
***

In the presence of higher external financing constraints (DEFC1=1), firms are
more likely to pay out less in dividends and share repurchases. Consistent with Chae et
al. (2009), financing constraints appear to be an influential determinant of corporate
payout policy. It is also important to note that higher (lower) financially constrained firms
are related to stronger (weaker) governance (CG1 and CG2) but lower (higher) free cash
flows (FCF1 and FCF2). It suggests that firms with lower credit rating or less credit
worthiness are likely to require stronger governance mechanisms for market scrutiny to
raise external capital.
Firms that experience financing constraints are also associated with intense
competition. For example, the average CONC1 of 693.58 for firms under higher
financing constraints (DEFC1=1) is less than 733.13 for firms with lower financing
constraints (DEFC1=0). It indicates that firms facing more competition (i.e., lower
concentration score) are likely to have lower credit rating and therefore less ability to
raise external funds. It follows that firms under external financing constraints tend to be
smaller firms (SIZE and SIZE2) and have lower leverage (LEV1 and LEV2) and
profitability (PROFIT1 and PROFIT2).
For robustness checks, we run Wilcoxon’s rank sum test to examine the median
differences of the determinants discussed above. Table 6 presents the comparisons in
median sorted by free cash flows and financing constraints. Overall, the results are
consistent with those reported in Table 5. In particular, firms with high free cash flows
but lower financing constraints tend to pay higher dividends and repurchase more stocks.
Similarly, firms in more competitive environments (CONC1) are likely to experience
higher financing constraints (DEFC1=1) and higher free cash flows (DFCF1=1).
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Variable
Dividend payouts
DIVt/ASSETSt-1
DIVt/SALESt-1
TPAYt/ASSETSt-1
TPAYt/SALESt-1
Corporate governance
CG1
CG2
Agency costs
FCF1
FCF2
Competition
CONC1
CONC2
Firm characteristics
LEV1
LEV2
SIZE1
SIZE2
PROFIT1
PROFIT2

DFCF1=1
0.0172
0.0143
0.0372
0.0318
0.3333
0.1000
0.1876
0.1379
529.9000
37.0000
0.2046
0.1093
6.3254
6.5180
0.1561
0.1646

Total
0.0124
0.0109
0.0238
0.0219
0.3333
0.1000
0.1435
0.0919
541.0000
37.9000
0.2613
0.1307
6.2567
6.3762
0.1087
0.1165

0.3273
0.1519
6.1669
6.2295
0.0584
0.0626

551.0000
38.7000

0.1010
0.0484

0.3333
0.1111

0.0097
0.0085
0.0164
0.0157

DFCF1=0

17.692
16.323
-1.574
-6.509
-82.645
-83.167

2.146
1.186

-99.059
-118.028

-1.607
1.864

-28.074
-22.047
-46.042
-37.703

***

***

***

***

***

**

***

***

***

***

***

***

Wilcoxon test

0.2236
0.1189
5.9179
6.0798
0.1058
0.1118

541.0000
37.3000

0.1419
0.0903

0.3333
0.1111

0.0113
0.0094
0.0222
0.0202

DEFC1=1

0.4699
0.1825
8.7082
8.6651
0.1377
0.1553

553.0105
41.0000

0.1548
0.1006

0.3333
0.0909

0.0212
0.0217
0.0364
0.0365

26.741
21.044
57.095
57.476
15.461
19.216

4.675
6.889

8.876
7.640

-4.047
-11.657

27.646
31.531
19.185
22.941

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

DEFC1=0 Wilcoxon test

Table 6
Median comparison by free cash flows and external financing constraints
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Before conducting a multivariate regression analysis of payout policy on different
governance measures, agency problems, financing constraints, and firm characteristics,
we estimate the correlations between these variables. Table 7 shows that for most pairs,
the correlations are largely low and do not generally pose multicollinearity problems,
suggesting that firm characteristics and governance measures adequately capture various
dimensions of the governance practices of the sample firms. The only exception is the
low correlation (0.50) between free cash flows (DFCF1) and profitability (PROFIT1),
because a higher correlation is expected since firms with high profitability tend to have
higher free cash flows.
Table 7
Correlations between explanatory variables
CG1

DEFC1

CG1

1.00

DFCF1

0.03

1.00

DEFC1

0.00

-0.09

1.00

CONC1

CONC1

LEV1

SIZE1

0.08

-0.06

0.04

1.00

LEV1

-0.14

-0.22

0.19

0.01

1.00

SIZE1

-0.04

-0.01

-0.05

0.14

0.27

1.00

0.03

0.50

-0.16

-0.04

-0.19

0.12

PROFIT 1

2.

DFCF1

PROFIT 1

1.00

The interrelationship among payouts, internal governance, and competition

Sequel to the univariate results of corporate governance and competition among firms,
we now examine their impacts on payout policy in the presence of agency problems and
external financing constraints. We begin the multivariate analysis with the effect of
corporate governance (CG) and then investigate how payouts are affected by CG in the
presence of agency problems (DFCF) by adding the interaction term (CG*DFCF). Based
on the discussions in Section II, incorporating agency problems proxied by free cash
flows should affect the impact of governance on payouts.
Furthermore, we include an additional interaction, CG*DFCF*DEFC, to address
changes in payout decisions when firms exhibit external financing constraints (DEFC).
We also control for industry effect, year fixed effect, and firm characteristics such as
leverage (LEV), firm size (SIZE), and profitability (ROE). Following Bring (1994), we
standardize CG, DFCF, DEFC, CG*DFCF, and CG*DFCF*DEFC, to allow for direct
comparisons on the economic significance between these regression coefficients. We
repeat the same estimation process for product market competition (CONC).
Finally, we examine the joint effects of CG and CONC on payout under the
influence of agency problems and external financing conditions. We therefore add a final
interaction term, CONC*CG*DFCF*DEFC in the multivariate regression settings. The
joint test of CG and CONC can be summarized in the following equation,
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Payoutsi,t

b1CONC i,t

b 2CONC i,t * CG i,t

b3CONC i,t * CG i,t * DFCFi

b 4CONC i,t * CG i,t * DFCFi * DEFC i firm characterisics

m
j 1

jDI j

n

DYk

k 1

(1)
i,t

where Payoutsi,t is the payouts for firm i at time t, CONCi,t is the product market
competition, CGi,t is the corporate governance measure, DFCFi is the dummy variable of
free cash flows, DEFCi is the dummy variable for external financing constraints, firm
characteristics are control variables of leverage, firm size, and profitability, DIj is the
dummy variable for industry j, DYk is the dummy variable for year k, and i,t is the error
term. To address the potential bias in the standard errors of a panel data due to residuals
correlated across firms and time, we estimate robust standard errors clustered by both
firm and year according to Thompson (2011) and Petersen (2009).
Since the results of corporate governance and competition are robust with both
sets of proxies as defined in Table 3, we report the results in Table 8 based on the first set
of estimates. Consistent with Chae et al. (2009) and Jiraporn and Ning (2006), Panel A
shows that corporate governance (CG) is negatively and statistically related to dividend
payouts and total payouts for 6 out of the 8 models. These results may appear to support
the substitution hypothesis. However, when we consider agency costs of free cash flows
(DFCF) with the interaction term, CG*DFCF, firms with stronger (weaker) governance
tend to pay higher (lower) cash dividends and repurchase more (less) stocks. As shown
in Panel A, the sum of both coefficients b1 and b2 is positive and significant. The results
are therefore consistent with the prediction of the outcome model.
Adding the interaction term, CG*DFCF*DEFC, for firms with external financing
constraints (DEFC=1), we find that firms have lower payouts. It indicates that in the
presence of agency costs, firms with higher external financial constraints may have little
choice but to reduce payouts to shareholders. As a result, external financing constraints
change the relationship between governance and payouts (b1+b2+b3 = -0.026 < b1+b2
= 0.230) just as agency problems affect payouts. Comparing the economic significance
of coefficients, it is interesting to note that agency costs of free cash flows (CG*DFCF)
is slightly more influential than external financing constraints (CG*DFCF*DEFC).
Panel B of Table 8 presents the results of the relationship between product market
competition and payout. We find that firms in higher (lower) concentrated industries
(CONC) are associated with lower (higher) payouts. Consistent with Grullon and
Michaely (2007), competition serves as a disciplinary force that induces managers to pay
more excess cash. It appears that payout is an outcome of stronger competition.
In the presence of agency problems, one would expect that the positive
relationship between competition and payout to be stronger according to the outcome
model but weaker based on the substitution model. Given that the interaction term,
CONC*DFCF, is positive in all of the 8 models reported in Panel B and reverses the
relationship between industry concentration and payout (b1+b2 > 0 compared to b1 < 0),
dividends can become a substitute for external governance in the presence of high agency
conflicts.
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Table 8
The effects of corporate governance and competition on corporate payout under agency problems and external financing constraints
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Under both agency problems (DFCF=1) and external financing constraints
(DEFC=1), firms in more concentrated industries tend to reduce payouts
(CONC*DFCF*DEFC < 0). This perhaps is not surprising, as financially constrained
firms may need to hoard cash and reduce payouts accordingly. It is important to note that
controlling for external financing constraints just as for agency problems substantially
affects a firm’s payout behavior. Failure to incorporate agency costs and external
financing costs may lead to a misspecification on the relationship between governance,
product market competition, and payout decisions.
Finally, we investigate the joint effects of corporate governance and competition
under agency problems and financing constraints. Panel C of Table 8 shows that industry
concentrations remain negatively related to payout ratios. This relationship, however, is
not affected when we add the interaction term, CONC*CG, for the effect of corporate
governance. In other words, corporate governance appears to have little impact on payout
when competition is considered. Our results are therefore consistent with Grullon and
Michaely (2007), and Giroud and Mueller (2010) who argue that competition is a
substitute for corporate governance, but contradict Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012) who
suggest that corporate governance complements competition.
The results for agency costs of free cash flows (CONC*CG*DFCF > 0) and
external financing constraints (CONC*CG*DFCF*DEFC < 0) in Panel C of Table 8 are
also consistent with those for competition alone as reported in Panel B. Specifically, firms
in more concentrated industries have higher payout in the presence of higher agency costs
but lower payout when encountering higher financing costs. These relationships hold
with or without the effect of corporate governance. On the other hand, corporate
governance seems to only matter as shown in Panel A when it is considered alone. Our
overall results are supportive of Giroud and Mueller (2011) who also find that governance
proxy, on average, is not significant when competition is accounted for.
V.

CONCLUSION

This paper extends the extant literature of payout policy by examining the joint impacts
of corporate governance and product market competition under the influence of agency
problems and external financing constraints. We confirm that both corporate governance
and product market competition alone are important in a firm’s payout decisions.
However, the nature and the extent of the impact depend on agency problems and external
financing constraints faced by the firms. In particular, these constraints imposed on firms
can reverse the relationship among governance, competition, and payout decisions.
Therefore, payout decisions can be an outcome of or a substitute for governance.
More importantly, we find that the importance of product market competition
subsumes the effect of corporate governance as an effective disciplinary force in
mitigating conflicts between managers and shareholders. These results are consistent
with Allen and Gale (2000) and Giroud and Mueller (2011), who suggest that competition
as a governance tool is more effective than the market for corporate control or other
monitoring mechanisms. It follows that the best policy in strengthening governance for
firms does not necessarily introduce more regulatory rules but perhaps facilitate more
industry competitiveness.
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